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REYNOLDS v. STATE
MIRANDA
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court did not err in 
permitting the State to inquire about the Defendant’s prior inconsistent 
statements made to detectives after invoking his Miranda protections. 
Reynolds v. State, 461 Md. 159, 188, 192 A.3d 617, 633 (2018).  Specifically, 
the court held that inconsistent statements made by a defendant do not 
constitute post-Miranda silence, but rather, are considered affirmative 
statements that may be used for impeachment purposes at trial. Id.  The court 
further held that the questions posed by prosecutors on cross-examination 
were not intended to draw meaning from silence, but rather, to prompt an 
explanation for prior inconsistent statements. Id. at 185, 192 A.3d at 632.   
     On April 14, 2014, Kevin Reynolds (“Reynolds”) was arrested in New 
York for the murder of Wesley King (“King”), who was shot and killed outside 
of his apartment complex in Montgomery County, Maryland.  Following his 
arrest, Detective Frank Colbert (“Colbert”) read Reynolds his Miranda rights. 
When Colbert questioned Reynolds about the murder of King, Reynolds 
identified himself as Dennis Graham and stated that he had nothing more to 
say.  Detectives continued their questioning and Reynolds informed them that 
he was likely in the Virgin Islands visiting family at the time of the murder, 
and that he had never been to Maryland more than passing through. 
     Prior to the start of trial, the Circuit Court of Maryland for Montgomery 
County held a suppression hearing to consider the statements Reynolds made 
during the April 2014 interview.  The suppression court ruled that Reynolds 
invoked his right to remain silent upon his utterance of the words “there’s 
nothing I have to say” during his first interview.  The suppression court further 
held that any questioning after Reynolds invoked his right to remain silent was 
in violation of Miranda, and therefore, inadmissible as substantive evidence.
However, the suppression court also held that the statements made were 
voluntary, and therefore, admissible for impeachment purposes should 
Reynolds elect to testify at trial.   
     At trial, Reynolds exercised his right to testify.  During his testimony, 
Reynolds identified himself, admitted to frequently transporting drugs from 
New York to Maryland for King, and stated that he was in New York at the 
time of King’s murder.  On cross-examination, the State posed questions that 
inquired about the inconsistencies in his statements made during the initial 
interview and those made during his testimony.  Reynolds’ counsel moved 
for
a mistrial, arguing that the State’s cross-examination was improper.  The trial 
court denied the motion, but issued a jury instruction limiting prior witness 
statements to be considered only to aid the jury in determining the witness’s 
credibility. 
     On January 13, 2015, the jury convicted Reynolds on all counts.  Reynolds 
noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
challenging the trial court’s decision to admit portions of his post-arrest 
statements.  The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed Reynolds’ 
conviction, holding that the State’s use of his inconsistent testimony was not 
in error, as the questions posed on cross-examination were classic 
impeachment questions used to point out discrepancies in Reynolds’ 
testimony.  
     Reynolds filed a timely petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, which was granted.  Reynolds, 461 Md. at 174, 192 A.3d at 652. 
The issue before the court was whether Reynolds’ right to due process was 
violated when the trial court allowed the state to cross-examine him regarding 
statements related to his alibi defense that were elicited after he exercised his 
right to remain silent.  Id.  Specifically, the court was asked to determine 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing impeachment 
questions on cross-examination as an exception to the exclusionary rule.  Id.
at 175-76, 102 A.3d at 626. 
     In order to determine whether Reynolds’s statements were admissible for 
impeachment purposes, the Court of Appeals of Maryland began by examining 
the Miranda rights, which act as procedural safeguards against compelled self-
incrimination. Reynolds, 461 Md. at 178, 192 A.3d at 627.  The Supreme Court 
held in Miranda that statements obtained from defendants during custodial 
interrogation were inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 177, 192 A.3d at 627.  However, later precedent 
clarified that inconsistent statements elicited in violation of Miranda can be 
used for impeachment purposes, so long as the statements were voluntarily 
made. Id. at 179, 192 A.3d at 628.  
     With the principle of Miranda established, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland next examined Supreme Court rulings on post-arrest, post-Miranda
silence. Reynolds, 461 Md. at 182, 192 A.3d at 630.  In Harris and Hass, the 
Court determined that a  voluntary statement obtained in violation of Miranda
that was inconsistent with a defendant’s direct examination at trial, could be 
used for the purpose of impeachment. Id.  During their respective trials, each 
defendant provided direct testimony that contradicted statements made 
following their arrest. Id.  The court in each case ultimately determined that 
impeaching material provides the jury with valuable information in assessing 
a defendant’s credibility and evidence against a defendant should not be 
exclusively barred when it aids the jury in rendering a fair verdict. Id. at 187, 
192 A.3d at 632.  
     In the case at bar, Reynolds provided detectives with statements that were 
inconsistent with his trial testimony. Reynolds, 461 Md. 187, 192 A.3d at 633. 
During his interview with Colbert, Reynolds identified himself as Dennis 
Graham, stated that he had only passed through Maryland, and stated that he 
was in the Virgin Islands at the time of King’s murder. Id.  At trial, Reynolds 
identified himself as Kevin Reynolds, admitted to frequently transporting 
drugs to Maryland for King, and testified that he was in New York at the time 
of King’s murder. Id.  The court found the circumstances of this case factually 
on par with those in Harris. Id.  
     Reynolds argued that the issue should be examined through the lens of post-
Miranda silence and not prior inconsistent statements.  Reynolds, 461 Md. at 
176, 192 A.3d at 626. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that despite 
Reynolds contention, the issue before the court was not one of post-Miranda
silence, but instead, revolved around voluntary and inconsistent statements 
made by a defendant. Id.  Here, Reynolds voluntarily provided details about 
his personal life that ran contrary to his trial testimony. Id. at 187, 192 A.3d at 
633. Therefore, in rendering its conclusion, the court held that the underlying
principle in Harris was equally applicable to this case, and Reynolds’
inconsistent statements could be used directly for impeachment purposes.  Id.
 The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the State’s questioning on 
cross-examination regarding statements elicited post-Miranda were not in 
violation of Reynolds’ right to due process. Reynolds, 461 Md. at 188, 192 
A.3d at 633.  Further, the court affirmed that a statement elicited post-Miranda
that is inconsistent with a defendant’s direct testimony at trial, can be used for
the purpose of impeachment. Id.  This holding allows for prosecutors to pose
questions regarding the credibility of a defendant’s statement in a manner that
is consistent with the truth-seeking purpose of the court.  Permitting
inconsistent statements to be free of safeguards against self-incrimination
emphasizes the importance of balancing the probative value of a defendant’s
statement with the risk of unfair prejudicial effects.
